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The ominous consequences of an extension of Allen to political trials
is suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas. He asks:
Would we tolerate removal of a defendant from the courtroom
during a trial because he was insisting on his constitutional rights,
albeit vociferously, no matter how obnoxious his philosophy might
have been to the bench46that tried him? Would we uphold contempt in that situation?
A third unresolved problem area involves trials used as a tactic by
radical minorities for their own political ends. Deliberate disruption,
designed to incite the extreme right into promulgating repressive
measures, has historically been utilized by extremist groups to rally
support for their attack on the system.
Each of these situations, like Allen, involves not simply a struggle
between right and wrong, but a confrontation between two conflicting
"rights." Each demands careful and responsible consideration of the
interests on both sides.47 The primary importance of Illinois v. Allen
may well lie in its application to these complex and menacing cases
of the future.
Donna H. Terry

ADmmnSTRATrvE LAw-SELEctnrE SERvicE-CoNscIENTmous OBJECroR
DmEMMA-QUESTION STUL UNRsoLv.E-Elliot Ashton Welsh refused

to submit to induction into the military service and was found guilty
in a United States District Court for violating federal law which makes
it a crime to refuse service in the Armed Forces.1 On June 1, 1966, he
was sentenced to three years in prison. Welsh asserted in his defense
that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form and therefore should be exempted from combat and noncombat
service based on Section 6 (j)of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act which exempts "any person... who, by reason of religious

training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war
46

Id. at 1067.

47 See generally, Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. Rxv. 1

(1943) Note The Supreme Court and FundamentalRights-A Problem of Judicial
Method, 23 VQW. L. Rv. 792, 807-08 (1970).
150 U.S.C. App. § 462 (a) (1964) which provides in part:
[Alny person... who othervise evades or refuses registration or service
in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this title [said sections]
...or who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to
F erform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this title
said sections] . . . shall, upon conviction in any district court of the
United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for
not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both ...
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in any form."2 The Ninth Circuit, finding no religious basis for the3
defendant's conscientious objector claim, affirmed the conviction.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held: Reversed.
Conscientious objector status must be given to "all those whose
consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs,
would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to
become a part of an instrument of war." Welsh v.United States, 90
S. Ct. 1792 (1970).
Several of the various conscription acts prior to World War I4
contained a limited number of conscientious objector exemptions.
However, the Draft Act of 19175 was the first exemption to apply in
general. Exemption was predicated on an objector's affiliation with a
"well recognized sect or organization at present organized and existing
and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate
in war in any form."6 This act was challenged in 1918 as contrary to
the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment 7
in that it denied equal protection for the free exercise of all religions

by giving preference to only certain religions. 8 The Court rejected
this contention as unsound and emphasized the necessity for granting
Congress the unlimited power to wage war successfully. The Court
then went one step further in restricting the scope of draft exemptions
by stating in Kramer v. United States9 that the Act would not protect
any objector whose convictions were based on philosophical, social,
or humanitarian beliefs. Two months later, President Wilson issued
an executive order'0 removing the affiliation requirement thus exempting any person who conscientiously objected to the war based on

"his own" religious beliefs.
2,50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j)(1964) which provides:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person
to be subject to combatant training and service in the Armed Forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious
training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological,
or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.
3404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968).
4 See, e.g., 12 Stat. 731 (1863); 13 Stat. 6 (1863); 32 Stat. 775 (1903).
540 Stat. 76 (1917).
6Id.at 78.
7 The full text of the first amendment is:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peacably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
8 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
9245 U.S. 478 (1918).
10 Exec. Order No. 2823, 11 Panama Canal Record 369 (1918).
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The next draft act, in 1940, changed the requirement so that an
exemption would be granted to anyone "who, by reason of religious
training and belief is conscientiously opposed to participation in war
in any form."'1 In no provision of the act was the phrase "religious
training and belief" defined, soon leading to an amount of confusion in
the lower federal courts. In a 1943 decision, 1 2 the Second Circuit
interpreted "religious training and belief' to be:
A response of the individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience
or God, that is for many persons at the present time the equivalent
of what has always been thought a religious impulse. 13
Applying this definition in a later case, 14 the same court granted an
exemption finding that one's humanitarian opposition to all wars was
based on religious rather than political views. Rejecting the Second
Circuit's broad interpretation, the Ninth Circuit in 194615 found the
phrase to mean "a responsbility to a supernatural authority." The
court quoted with approval Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in his dissenting
opinion in Macintosh v. United States,'6 where he stated: "The essence
of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation."17
With the Supreme Court apparently having no desire to wade into
the confusion,' 8 Congress, adopting the Ninth Circuit's interpretation,
passed the Selective Service Act of 1948 which defined "religious training and belief as:
[A]n individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does
not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal moral code. 19
This act was challenged in the Ninth Circuit in 195220 on the grounds
that the "Supreme Being" test was unconstitutional under the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment in that it denied
11Selective Training and Service Act, § 5 (g), 54 Stat. 885, (1940). For a
complete discussion of this act, see Lane, "Conscientiously opposed," "by reason of
religious training and belief," as used in the Selective Service and TrainingAct of
1940, 31 GEo. L.J. 60 (1942); Tinnelley, The Conscientious Objector Under the
Selective Act of 1940, 15 ST. Joines L. R v. 235 (1941).
12 United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
13 Id.at 708.
14 United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
15 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
16 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
17 Id. at 633-34.
IsThe Supreme Court was given the opportunity to resolve the issue in
Berman, however it denied certiorari. See note 15 supra.
19
20 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 451 (1958).
See George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1952).
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free religious practice to those whose religion did not worship a
21
Supreme Being. The Court, as it did in the first draft law cases,
upheld the act by emphasizing the power of Congress in areas of

national defense.
Nine years later, however, the Supreme Court began moving in the
opposite direction as evinced in Torcasco v. Watkins 22 where it struck
down as contrary to the establishment clause a provision of the Maryland Constitution which required public officials to take an oath
affirming their belief in the existence of God. The constitutionality
of the existing law was finally challenged in 1965 in United States v.
Seeger.23 The Second Circuit had declared Section 6 (j) unconstitutional stating that the Supreme Being test amounted to a distinction
between "internally derived and externally compelled beliefs" and that
by preferring one religion to another, the act violated the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. 24 The Supreme Court, however,

passed over the constitutional questions and developed a new and
somewhat broad definition of religion. Under this "Seeger Test" a
conscientious objector's opposition to war may stem from:
A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by2 5the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption ....
With the Supreme Being test rendered meaningless, Congress passed
the Military Selective Service Act of 196726 which removed the Supreme
Being requirement from the definition of religion within the statute.

In the aftermath of Seeger, confusion, dissatisfaction, and concerned
speculation exists as to how far the decision will be extended and as
to how broadly religion will be defined. 27 The Tenth Circuit has held
that a claimant, even though predominantly influenced by sociological
and philosophical views, may nevertheless be granted an exemption
21 See note 8 supra, and accompanying text.

22 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
23 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
24 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
25 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). For a complete discussion of this case, see Houston, Conscientious Objectors: The Aftermath of
United States v. Seeger, 30 ALBNY L.R. 304 (1966); Comment, Conscientious
Objectors: The New "Parallel Belief" Test-United States v. Seeger, 14 CATHOtiC
U.L. REv. 238 (1965).
26 81 Stat. 100 (1967) codified in 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-71 (1968). Thus,
the wording returns to that of the 1940 statute. See text at note 11 supra.
27 See, e.g., United States v. Stolberg, 346 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1965) where
the court stated:
It is difficult to state just what Stolberg's religious beliefs were....
In view of the decision in United States v. Seeger.... [W~e are forced
to conclude that Stolberg's beliefs qualified him for classification of conscientious objector. Id. at 364-65.
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if there can be found some influence exerted by religious training.28
One federal district court granted conscientious objector status to a
declared atheist by holding that such atheistic beliefs could have been
"reached by religious training and belief as that term [had] been construed by the Supreme Court in Seeger."29 The courts are now facing
the problem that two people may have the same reasons for application
for exemption, but by phrasing the application in religious terms, one

may be granted an exemption where the other may not.30 Finally,

another federal district court recently suggested that the Court should
overlook the religious requirement of the statute and grant exemption
to all those who strongly oppose war for any reason be it moral, social,
philosohphical, or religious, or that Congress should step in and revise
the present statute. 31
While the instant case could have been the turning point in reaching
a practical solution to the conscientious objector dilemma, it appears to
be a confusing and perplexing extension of Seeger. Three separate

opinions presented in the case represent the present Court's attempted
resolution of this problem.

The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Black stated that Welsh's conviction must be reversed because it was inconsistent with the Court's

decision in Seeger. By finding some "religious basis" for the defendant's
convictions and beliefs, he was found to be exempted under the
statute. Although the defendant was unable to claim an objection
because of "religious training and belief' as required by statute, the

32
Court nevertheless found him to be conscientiously opposed to war.
This performance of judicial magic is explained in the following statement by Mr. Justice Black:
28

See Fleming v. United States, 344 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1965).

29 See United States v. Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 (D. Md. 1968).
30

See, e.g., In re Weitzman, 284 F. Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1968) where an
alien was refused naturalization because her objection to rendering military service
was based on a "biological push" and not any "theological pull." An examination
of parts of the trial record infer that the petitioner could have rephrased her
motives in religious terms and have had her objection accepted.
3' See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed, 90 S.Ct. 2117 (1970). There the court stated:
Earlier this opinion noted that it is practical to accord the same status
to non-religious conscientious objectors as to religious objectors. Moreover, it is diflicult to imagine any ground for a statutory distinction except
religious prejudice. In short, in the draft act Congress unconstitutionally
discriminated against atheists, agnostics, and men like Sisson, who,
whether they be religious or not, are motivated in their objection to the
draft by profound moral beliefs which constitute the central convictions
3of
2 their beings. Id. at 911.
While applying for conscientious objector status, Welsh was unable to
sign the statement in the Selective Service form which read: "I am by reason of
my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war
in any form", and would only sign when the words "religious training and"
were deleted.
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But very few registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the
word 'religious' as used in § 6 (j), and accordingly a registrants
statement that his beliefs are non religious is a highly unreliable
33
guide for those charged with administering the exemption.
Thus the Court is now stretching the exemption under Section 6 (j)
to apply to anyone who is conscientiously opposed to all wars, even if
his beliefs are based on policy considerations. The majority opinion
explains that the reason for the exemption is that these certain views
are not "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code" as rejected by the statute.34 Mr. Justice
Harlan, in his concurring opinion perhaps best characterizes the
majority's reasoning:
Today the Court makes explicit its total elimination of the statutorily required religious content for a conscientious objector exemption. The Court now says: 'if an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely ethicalor moral in source and
content but which nevertheless impose on him a duty of conscience
to refrain from participating in any war at any time (emphasis
added), he qualifies for a § 6 (j) exemption.' 3 5
The most reasonable and practical answer to the conscientious
objector question is put forth by Mr. Justice Harlan: "§ 6 (j) in
limiting this draft exemption to those opposed to war in general
because of theistic beliefs runs afoul of the religious clauses of the
First Amendment." 36 He thoroughly attacks the majority opinion on
two major points. First, he criticizes the majority's manner of statutory
construction and interpretation in "transforming" the statute with an
interpretation designed to avoid the constitutional defects of its plainly
intended purpose. Secondly, Justice Harlan attacks the overbroad
definition of religion presented in the majority opinion concluding
that "any asserted and strongly held belief" would satisfy this new
requirement of religion. Justice Harlan's theory is that the will of
Congress should be strictly enforced by interpreting the wording of a
statute in the manner it was originally intended to be read. An
elaborate discussion of previous Congressional interpretations of the
word "religion" demonstrates that in no way can the word "religious"
be applied to the present beliefs of this defendant. Thus, the issue
which has so long been avoided by the Court, and which Justice
Harlan deems the major issue demanding resolution is "whether a
statute that defers to the individual's conscience only when his views
33 Welsh v. United States, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 1797 (1970).
34 Id. at 1798.
35 Id. at 1799 (Harlan, J., concurring).
36 Id.
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emanate from adherence to theistic religious beliefs is within the
power of Congress."3 7 Concluding that the establishment clause
strictly forbids such a statute, Justice Harlan suggests legislation
which would encompass all groups of theistic or non-theistic believers.
He states: "The common denominator must be the intensity of moral
conviction with which a belief is held."38 The source of such a belief
does not have to be of the traditional religious nature.
The dissenting opinion through Mr. Justice White is in agreement
with Justice Harlan concerning the need for a strict interpretation
of the statute, but disposes of the defendant's contentions on the
ground that he has no standing to challenge Section 6 (j) irrespective
of whether it is contrary to the Constitution. The defendant's arguments are rejected on two major points: (1) his objection to war is not
inspired by any form of "religion" based on the original interpretation
of the word as intended by Congress; and (2) "[n]othing in the First
Amendment prohibits drafting Welsh and other nonreligious objectors
to war."39 Justice White presents two reasons why Congress should
grant an exemption based solely on one's religious beliefs. First, as
a matter of practicality, anyone holding strong anti-war convictions
would burden and decrease the effeciency of the military. Secondly, to
compel one to fight in a war, contrary to his religious beliefs would
be denying him the free exercise of his religion as guaranteed by the
first amendment. In interpreting the first amendment, Justice White
distinguishes between the religious objector and the non-religious
objector. The free exercise clause protects the beliefs and conduct
of the religious objector to the extent that such conduct does not become
socially harmful. The non-religious objector has the right to believe
and to speak, but in no section of the first amendment is the freedom
to act safeguarded. He concludes that Section 6 (j) does not in any
way violate the establishment clause by stating:
The Establishment Clause as construed by this Court unquestionably has independent significance; its function is not wholly auxiliary to the Free Exercise Clause. It bans some involvements of the
State with religion which otherwise might be consistent with the
Free Exercise Clause. But when in the rationally based judgment
of Congress free exercise of religion calls for shielding religious
objectors from compulsory combat duty, I am reluctant to frustrate
the legislative will by striking down the statutory exemption because it does not also reach those to40 whom the Free Exercise
Clause offers no protection whatsoever.
37 Id. at 1805.
38Id. at 1806.
39 Id. at 1812 (White, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 1814.
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In view of the three opinions presented by the Court, the problem
becomes not only what paths of decision Congress and the Court
will take in achieving some pragmatic and just solution to the
conscientious objector dilemma, but also, in a complex society of free
men, how can the dignity and respect of each free man be preserved?
Thus, the scope of the problem becomes two dimensional. By
expanding the definition of "religion", as the majority of the Court has
done, to include almost any strongly held belief, the second dimension
becomes satisfied but the first is totally frustrated. This frustration
is evident in the confusion existing in the lower courts and local draft
boards. Each courts is faced with the question of what exactly does the
Supreme Court mean by "religion" and in what way is this meaning
restricted or contradicted by the wording of the statute. The local
draft boards face the problem of applying the Welsh criteria for
granting an exemption while Congress states that beliefs, no matter
how strongly held, will not grant the applicant an exemption if his
objection is based on philosophical views or a purely personal moral
code. 41 The difficulty of such a chore is reflected by an expert of the
Justice Department: "It'll take the good Lord Himself to know what a
CO really is." 42 In addition, many objectors may state their beliefs to
be religious for the sole reason of obtaining an exemption, when in
fact, the strength and sincerity of such beliefs is questionable and
held with less force than one who is refused exemption because his
belief is philosophically or socially derived.
The proposed solution of the dissent in the Welsh case, i.e. of
defining religion in its traditional terms and upholding the present
law, leaves the two-fold problem completely unattended. The con43
scientious objector question would be thrust backward thirty years
and the chances of reaching any rational solution would be totally
obscured. Such a restrictive view taken by the highest court in the
41 See note 2 supra. Subsequent to the decision in the present case, the
national draft director, Curtis W. Tarr established the following guidelines to be
followed by the local draft boards:
1) "The man's belief must be sincere."
(2) "The man must be opposed to war in all forms. This decision does

not open the door to exemption for opposition to a particular war."

(3) "It must be something more than a personal moral code. He needs to
have taken into account the thoughts of other wise men; he needs to have
consulted some system of belief."

(4) "His belief needs to be the result of some rigorous kind of training."
See U.S. NEWS & Wonx n REPORT, June 29, 1970, at 18.
42 NEWSWEEk, June 29, 1970, at 19.
43
The present grounds for a conscientious objector exemption are the same
as those in the 1940 Selective Service Act. See note 11 supra, and accompanying
text. Thus a strict interpretation of the wording of the statute would just recreate
the problems which developed after that act was passed.
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United States would also have the effect of outwardly rejecting the
importance of individual thought, philosophy, and morality.
Thus, two important questions remain: Will Congress realize that it
has created a law which has been robbed of all legislative intent
through rewording by the Court? Will the Court realize that it has
taken the word "religion" and turned it upside down, inside out, and
stretched its definition to the point where no one can accurately
define it? The decision ultimately will rest in the hands of Congress.
The Court has attempted to provide guidelines in trying to preserve
the conscientious objector exemption, but such guidelines have been
carried beyond practical application. What is needed is a new format
laid down by Congress redefining the exemption, or in the alternative,
a total renunciation of all exemptions. Since the latter would merely
cause a recycling of the problems created under the religious clauses
of the first amendment, the former appears to be the only solution.
The most pragmatic and fair answer to the question of who should
qualify as a conscientious objector would be, in accord with the views
prescribed by Mr. Justice Harlan, a new law which grants the
exemption based on the strength, not label, of the applicant's conscientious objection. Thus, one may be granted exemption from the
military service because he is firmly opposed to all war. The fact
that his beliefs originate from philosophical, religious, social, or moral
ideas should only be important in determining how strongly he
possesses these beliefs. Such a law would establish a test that could
be uniformly applied by the lower courts and local draft boards,
thus alleviating much of the present confusion. The term "religion"
must be placed in a more modern perspective. Religion is a personal
experience; a set of internally based convictions created from socially
derived forces. Does not such an experience also fit the definition of
one's morality or philosophy? But religion is only one aspect of one's
convictions, and its definition should not be expanded beyond the
traditional concepts. In our present democratic society each individual is granted the right to extract from the vast amounts of knowledge placed before him, a set of principles making up his own personal code. And one may adhere to his set of principles as firmly as
any other, regardless of their origin. Thus one's "biological push" may
possess the same vigor as another's "theological pull". 44
The Constitution of the United States forbids the establishment of
any religion while guaranteeing the same and equal protection of all
laws to every citizen, regardless of his beliefs. One's personal con44

See note 30 supra, and accompanying text.
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victions, be they religiously, morally, or philosophically inspired
should be given the same weight by Congress and the courts in
determining who may be excused from participating in a war.
Richard D. Pompelio

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-ANCILLARY JUEISDIC£oN-THmIDP~AT' D ENDAmA's CouNmv
cunm AGAINST PLAnnF wnTHOUT AN
INDEPENDENT BASIs OF FEDmrAL JUmIsDIcrION-In an action brought in

United States district court for breach of contract, negligence and
misrepresentation with respect to two construction contracts, movant
Revere Copper and Brass, Incorporated [hereinafter Revere] sued
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company [hereinafter Aetna] as surety on
performance bonds it executed on the two contracts for George A.
Fuller Company [hereinafter Fuller]. Fuller had agreed to indemnify
Aetna for all losses it sustained on the bonds. Aetna, therefore,
impleaded 1 Fuller as a third-party defendant under Rule 14(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Fuller counterclaimed under
Rule 14(a) 3 alleging breach of warranty, negligence, wanton and willfil misconduct, and misrepresentation on Revere's part. Both Revere
1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 allowing impleader does not establish

a right of reimbursement indemnity, nor contribution; but where there is
a basis for such right Rule 14 expedites the presentation and in some
cases accelerated the accrual of such right. 3 J. Moore, FDEDAL PRACCE
[hereinafter cited as MooRE]
1403 (2d ed. 1968). See also. C. W EcHr,LAw OF FEDERAL CouNTs
[hereinafter cited as WriGH] § 76 (2d ed. 1970).
2 Rule 14. Third-Party Practice.
(a) WHEN DEFENDANT MAY Busc IN THRD PARTY.
At any time after commencement of the action defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.... The person served
with the summons and third- party complaints, hereinafter called thirdparty defendant, shall make-his defenses to the third-party plaintiff's
claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party
plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided
in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may also assert anti claim against
the plaintiff arising out of the transactionor occurrence that is the subjeclaitif'
mttr claim
o teclimagins
hir-prt
plinif.arising
The
plaintif may assert
-any
against the tethird-party
defendant
out
of theclaim
transaction
is theand
subject
matter of the
plaintiff's
against or
theoccurrence
third-partythat
plaintiff,
the third-party
defendant
thereupon
shall
assert
his
defenses
as
provided
in
Rule
12
and
his
counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. Any party may
move to strike the third-party claim, or for its severance or separate trial.
.. FED. R. Ciy. P. 14(a) (emphasis added).
3 This counterclaim under Rule 14(a) is not a true counterclaim since the
parties are not "opposing" prior to its service. MOORE II 14.17.

